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Abstract Label manipulation attacks are a subclass
of data poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learn-
ing used against different applications, such as mal-
ware detection. These types of attacks represent a seri-
ous threat to detection systems in environments having
high noise rate or uncertainty, such as complex networks
and Internet of Thing (IoT). Recent work in the liter-
ature has suggested using the K-Nearest Neighboring
(KNN) algorithm to defend against such attacks. How-
ever, such an approach can suffer from low to miss-
Classification rate Accuracy. In this paper, we design
an architecture to tackle the Android malware detection
problem in IoT systems. We develop an attack mecha-
nism based on Silhouette clustering method, modified
for mobile Android platforms. We proposed two Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN)-type deep learning
algorithms against this Silhouette Clustering-based La-
bel Flipping Attack (SCLFA). We show the effective-
ness of these two defense algorithms - Label-based Semi-
supervised Defense (LSD) and clustering-based Semi-
supervised Defense (CSD) - in correcting labels being
attacked. We evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms by varying the various machine learning pa-
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rameters on three Android datasets: Drebin, Contagio,
and Genome and three types of features: API, Intent,
and Permission. Our evaluation shows that using ran-
dom forest feature selection and varying ratios of fea-
tures can result in an improvement of up to 19% Accu-
racy when compared with the state-of-the-art method
in the literature.
Keywords Adversarial Machine Learning (AML),
semi-supervised defense (SSD), malware detection,
adversarial example, label flipping attacks, deep
learning.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) algorithms have the ability to
accurately predict patterns in data. However, some of
the data can come from uncertain and untrustworthy
sources. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability as part
of what is known as Adversarial Machine Learning (AML)
attacks. Poisoning attacks or data poisoning attacks are
a subclass of AML attacks, in which attackers inject
malicious data into the training set in order to compro-
mise the learning process, and effect the algorithm per-
formance in a targeted manner. Label flipping attacks
are a special type of data poisoning, in which the at-
tacker can control labels assigned to a fraction of train-
ing points. Label flipping attacks can significantly di-
minishes the performance of the system, even if the at-
tacker’s capabilities are otherwise limited. Recent work
in AML looks into effectiveness of poisoning attacks in
degrading performance of popular classification algo-
rithms, such as support vector machines (SVM) [38],
embedded features selection methods [34,37], neural
networks [13], and deep learning systems [25]. Most at-
tacks in the literature assume attackers can manipu-
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late both features and labels associated with the poi-
soning data. However, sometimes the attacker’s capa-
bilities are limited to manipulating labels, and he is
only able to flip the labels to fool the ML classifier.
These types of attacks are known as flipping attacks.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have gained significant
success in classifying well labeled data. However, label
flip type poisoning attacks can reduce the Accuracy of
these algorithms [36]. Therefore, there is a need for al-
ternative methods for training DNNs that takes label
flipping attacks into account. Such methods should be
able to identify and correct mislabeled samples or re-
weight the data terms in the loss function according to
the extracted label.
There are a number of work in the literature focused
on identifying and dealing with poisoning attacks. For
example, an algorithmic method evaluates the impact
of each training sample on the performance of learn-
ing algorithms [7]. Although this method is effective
in some cases, it cannot be generalized to the large
dataset. Among other defensive mechanisms, the out-
lier detection is used to identify and remove suspicious
samples. But, this method has a limited performance
(i.e., Accuracy) against label flipping attacks [26]. An-
other category of related works mainly focus on learning
strategies that can be applied on flip labels. Such solu-
tions are divided into two categories. In the first group,
it can directly learn flipped labels, whilst in the sec-
ond group, it can focus on an extra set of clean data.
In the first case, the label flipping module is used to
identify correctly labeled data [24,35], and to modify
the changes on the labels to reset the data terms in
the loss function. Performance of this technique is sig-
nificantly impacted by its label cleaning Precision and
its rate of flip sample estimation. In the second group
of methods, an additional set of clean data is used to
guide the learning agent through flipped data [28]. De-
spite promising results, both groups of methods have a
common default. They try to fix the flipped labels, or
they re-weight the terms for data points. This default
will inevitably cause errors for some data points.
Motivated by these considerations, in this paper, we
consider the binary classification for sampling and anal-
ysis of Android malware. We only assume the weakest
capability for the attacker. That is, we assume that the
attacker has no perfect knowledge about the learning
algorithm, the loss function optimized by the system,
or the initial the training data and a set of features
used by the learning algorithm. We show that having
the system identifying and retraining the wrong label,
and using our proposed Semi-Supervised (SS) approach
to training will result in better results. To this end, we
suggest a solution that covers the existing data points
that are mislabeled and improves the Accuracy of the
classification algorithm. To do so, we present an archi-
tecture for learning flipped data. Then, we identify a
small part of the mislabeled training set, whose labels
are likely to be correct, and the flipped labels associ-
ated with other data are ignored. Afterward, we train a
deep neural network in a SS manner based on selected
data.
1.1 Contributions
In this context, several natural questions are arising,
such as: How can we define attack based on label flip-
ping algorithm which can fool the classifier? Is it possi-
ble to design an enhanced ML model to improve system
security by presenting some secure algorithms against
a given label flipping attack? How can we tune and test
the countermeasure solutions to deal with label flipping
attack? The answer to these queries is the goal of this
paper. More in detail, the goal of the paper summarizes
as follows: First, we rank the data points within each
class and then hold the label for the points that have
higher rankings. If no clean set is available, the ranking
is based on the multi-way classification neural network,
which is trained from the original training dataset. In
fact, a binary classifier is learned that, while clean labels
are available, separates data containing clean labels and
flipped labels. Second, we apply a temporary ensem-
ble for semi-supervised deep neural network training.
Hence, our original contributions are as follows:
– We present an architecture for learning flipped data
which reflects our main focus in the malware detec-
tion system.
– We propose a label flipping poisoning technique to
attack the Android malware detection based on deep
learning: where an algorithm is proposed for crafting
efficient prototypes so that the attacker can deceive
the classification algorithm. In this technique, we use
Silhouette clustering to find an appropriate sample to
flip its label.
– We introduce a DL-based semi-supervised approach
against label flipping attacks in the malware detec-
tion system called LSD, which uses label propagation
and label spreading algorithms along with CNNs to
predict the correct value of labels for the training set.
– We implement a countermeasure method based on
clustering algorithms as a defense mechanism. It is
a DL-based semi-supervised approach against label
flipping attacks in the malware detection system that
improves the detection Accuracy of the compromised
classifier. In this approach we use four clustering
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metrics and validation data to re-labeled poisoned
labels.
– We conduct our experiments on two scenarios on
three real Android datasets using three feature types
compared to the cutting-edge method and deeply an-
alyze the trade-offs that emerge. The source code of
the paper is available in Github [31].
To best of our knowledge, none of the previous works
in literature has conducted a similar analysis. The closet
paper to our method is KNN-based Semi-Supervised
Defense (KSSD) [26], in which the authors have en-
tailed KNN strategy to relabel samples by considering
the distance between them. However, the work in [26] is
tailored to the relabeling of samples, they are unable to
specify some similar samples that may be malware and
benign and may mislabel the features of benign sam-
ple due to low distance of samples. Unlike the [26], in
this paper we explicitly tackle the poisoning samples lo-
cated far from the decision boundary and relabel them.
Also the defense method presented in [26] is unable to
distinguish overlapping areas of two classes and can-
not correctly label the poisoning samples located there
while our defense methods imposes the model to tackle
such data points and relabeling them.
1.2 Organization of the paper
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2
overview the related works. Section 3 details the prob-
lem definition, the presented architecture, and the re-
lated components. Section 4 presents our proposed at-
tack model inspired by AML architecture and reports
the proposed defense strategies against the raised at-
tack. We evaluate the performance of the algorithms in
Section 5. In Section 6 we detail the results of the ex-
periment and provide some open discussion regarding
our method. Section 7 presents conclusions and future
work. Table 1 shows the important abbreviations used
in this paper.
Table 1: Important abbreviations used in this paper.
Notations Description
AML Adversarial Machine Learning
SSL semi-supervised learning
LSD Label-based Semi-supervised Defense
CSD clustering-based Semi-supervised Defense
KSSD KNN-based Semi-Supervised Defense
GAN Generative Adversarial Network
CNN Convolutional Neural NetworK
LP Label Propagation
LS Label Spreading
RI Rand Index
MI Mutual Information
FMI Fowlkes-Mallows Index
2 Related work
In this section, we classify the related work in the liter-
ature into two different defense classes: i) we will cover
defense approaches that try to correct labels in Sec-
tion 2.1, and ii) defense strategies that ignore poisoned
labels and adopt semi-supervised learning methods to
protect the model against attacks are then covered in
Section 2.2. Hence, we draw conceptual relationships
and delineate the most recent defense strategies applied
to tackle the label flipping attack and identify relevant
major alternatives for comparison.
2.1 Defense algorithms against poisoning attacks
The problem of classification with label noise - misla-
beling in class variable - is an active area of research.
The paper [12] gives a comprehensive overview of both
the theoretical and applied aspects of this area.Label
flipping mechanism is a solution to cover label noise in
the classifiers [9]. This method can model the overall
label flipping probability. However, it is lack of consid-
ering individual specific characteristics in label noise.
In [20], the authors create a lightweight method called
Curie to protect SVM Classier against poisoning at-
tacks. The preliminary idea behind this method is to
distinguish the suspicious data points and remove them
outside the dataset before starting the learning step of
the SVM algorithm. In other words, Curie’s algorithm
flips labels in the training dataset to defend SVM clas-
sifiers against poisoning attacks. They cluster the data
in the feature space and try to calculate the average dis-
tance of each point from the other points in the same
cluster with related weight and train model and test in
some datasets. They present that their defense method
is able to correct 95% of samples in the training dataset.
Additionally, the authors in [23] describe a poisoning
algorithm to solve the bi-level optimization problem
based on back-gradient optimization [22]. The proposed
algorithm applies automatic differentiation technique
to compute the gradient in the optimization problem.
This algorithm using gradient method to resolve the op-
timization problem which takes several computational
time, it can pose challenges in complex networks such
as neural networks and deep learning. Thus, they ap-
ply a novel technique named back-gradient optimiza-
tion to allow computing the gradient of interest in a
more computationally efficient and stable manner to
shape their ML model. Authors in [32] explicitly inves-
tigate data poisoning attacks for the semi-online set-
ting, unlike other works which mostly based on the of-
fline setting. The work in [29] argues that it is possi-
ble to perform targeted attacks on specific testing data
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without declining the overall performance of classifier
along with any control of adversary over the labeling
of training data. - The methodology proposed in [6] is
suitable to identify and remove poisonous data in IoT
systems. This method, mainly, exploits data provenance
to identify manipulated data before the training step to
improve the performance of classification. Compared to
our method, the defense method presented in [6] cannot
correctly label the poisoning samples while our defense
methods imposes the model to tackle such data points
and relabeling them. The work in [10] focus on build-
ing an automatic robust multiple kernel-based logistic
regression classifier against poisoning attacks without
applying any cross-validation. Despite the fact that pro-
posed classifier may improve performance and learning
speed; it does suffer from lack of any theoretical guar-
antees. To address this issue, they extend their method
and entail new structure to resist the negative effect
of random label noise as well as a wide range of non-
random label noises [8].
2.2 Semi-supervised learning defense algorithms
Another active area of research is the one dealing with
learning from unlabeled data. The semi-supervised learn-
ing approach, along with applying unlabeled data to
learn better models is particularly relevant to our work.
The semi-supervised approaches include multiview learn-
ing like [11], co-training [28,33], graph-based methods
like [17], and semi-supervised ML solutions like SVM [21],
and our proposed work (DL-based semi-supervised so-
lution). These approaches try tackle that many suc-
cessful learning algorithms need access to a large set of
labeled data. To address this issue, i.e. lack of avail-
ablity of labeled data, a combination of tri-training
with a deep model wee used in [11] to build Tri-Net,
which can use massive set of unlabeled data to help
to learn with limited labeled data. The semi-supervised
deep learning model generates three modules to exploit
unlabeled data by considering model initialization, di-
versity augmentation, and pseudo-label editing. Graph-
based transduction approach that works through the
propagation of few labels, called label propagation, was
used in [17] to improve the classification performances
and obtain estimated labels. This method consists of
two steps. In the first step, the classifier trains through
labeled and the predicts pseudo-labeled. In the second
step, the nearest neighbor graph constructs based on
the previous trained classifier. A limitation to this ap-
proach is that practically graph models are often mis-
specified. However, this could potentially be overcomed
by employing highly expressive model families like neu-
ral networks [19]. Hence, in S3VM method [21], the
authors adopt SVM solution to finding the flipped la-
bel examples in a dataset and improve the safeness of
the semi-supervised support vector machines (S3VM).
They indicate that performance of their method is not
statistically significantly worse than the solution shaped
with labeled data alone. The major limitation of this
method is that it is not easy to use such method for
large amounts of noisy samples and outliers and it ex-
ponentially reduce ML performance.
3 System model and proposed architecture
In this section, we first provide a formal definition our
problem (see Section 3.1). Then, in Section 3.2, we in-
troduce the proposed Android malware detection ar-
chitecture used in the paper. In particular, Fig. 1 will
describe the components of the proposed architecture.
3.1 Problem definition
Consider the datasets as follows.
D = {(xi, yi) ∈ (X,Y )}, i = 1, . . . , n (1)
where n is the number of malware samples. If xi has
the j feature, we have xij = 1. Otherwise xij = 0, and
X ⊆ {0, 1}k - a k-dimensional space. The variable y
represents the label of the samples with yi ∈ {0, 1} and
the D set has an unknown distribution on X × Y . We
assume the training set is defined as follows.
S = {(xk, yk)}, k = 1, . . . ,m (2)
where S is the label set. The flipping attack label aims
to find a collection such as P containing samples in
S so that when their labels are flipped, it minimizes
the desired target for the attacker. For simplicity, we
assume that the attacker’s goal is to maximize the loss
function which we define it as L(w, (xj , yj)).
3.2 Proposed architecture
In this section, we present our architecture to tackle the
Android malware detection problem in IoT systems (see
Fig. 1).
In Fig. 1, we present a general scheme of our pro-
posed architecture and the proposed attack and defense
algorithms which use for Android applications. In this
architecture, we assume a complex set of IoT devices
(i.e., IoT systems) which are communicating with each
other, represented by the yellow oval in the figure. We
assume that some of the IoT devices are using Android
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Fig. 1: Architecture overview of proposed method. ML= machine learning; SLFA is our attack method and LSD and CSD
are our defense methods.
OS platforms. We also assume that an attacker can
get access to some of the IoT devices. Hence, he can
manipulate the data they transferring to each other.
As a result, the data traffic of each Android data can
include those from malware apps, represented by the
black Android app symbol in our figure. Each Android
app, whether malware and benign, presents as a vector
of different features with various labels. ML algorithms
exposed to adversary attacks can add a variety of per-
turbations to data to fool ML algorithms. Hence, in this
architecture, an adversary can get access to the dataset
and flip the labels by adding some perturbation of ex-
isting labels. Our feature selection component gives the
ability to select the choice of features. We then gen-
erate a binary vector of each Android app and input
the result to the ML model. A final component of our
architecture is the detection system composed of the
ML model and our proposed defense algorithms. Our
architecture can increase the robustness of our detec-
tion system against flipping label attacks, and increase
the Accuracy of malware/benign classifications. In the
following section, we explore our attack and defense al-
gorithms.
4 Proposed attack and defensive solutions
In this section, the proposed classification algorithm
used in the paper is described first in Section4.1. We
then describe our attack strategy, inspired by Silhouette
clustering method in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents
our two defense solutions against the attack proposed
in the previous section. Finally, we report the compu-
tational complexity of our strategies in Section 4.4.
4.1 Classification algorithm
In this paper, we incorporate a deep CNN to classify
the binary samples. We adopt the overfitting method
to find out how good our dataset size is. Shift invariant
or CNN is a multilayer perceptrons strategy to tackle
the fully connected neurons in each layer and help to
prone the over-fitting data and can include more com-
plex patterns. To do so, we try to classify our data using
a training set and then repeat the classification using
cross-validation. If we increase the data size, it gives
better results in CNN classification processing.
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Fig. 2: Proposed classification algorithm architecture. Conv=convolution; (A,B,C)=(filters, kernel size, stride); (C,D)= (pool
size, stride).
Fig. 2 presents the proposed CNN architecture for
the classification algorithm. In this figure, we can see
that we apply three sequential layers of one-dimensional
convolution (Conv-1D) that has 16, 32, and 64 filters.
In each of these layers, we have kernel-size with value
2 and stride with value 2. We apply Maxpooling be-
tween the convolution layers to prevent overfitting by
reducing the computational load, memory, and number
of parameters. Each Maxpooling layer creates four pool
size with two strides. After applying three convolutional
layers, we adopt a Flattened layer and a Dense layer. In
the Dense layer, we use Adam optimizer and Sigmoid
activation function to shape the classification algorithm
and the out of the Dense layer is the classified data.
4.2 Attack strategy: Silhouette Clustering-based Label
Flipping Attack (SCLFA)
In this subsection, we apply Silhouette clustering method
to flip the labels. We name this attack silhouette Clustering-
based Label Flipping Attack (SCLFA). Silhouette clus-
tering is a type of clustering technique in which can
interpret and validate the consistency of data clusters.
Silhouette provides a concise visual presentation object
classifications. This technique defines a measurement
called silhouette value (SV) that expresses the self clus-
ter similarity or cohesion of per object comported to
other clusters or separation, which is between [-1,1]. If
the silhouette value is one, it presents well matching of
the object to its own cluster and is less likeness to other
neighboring clusters. If the majority of the objects in a
cluster have high SVs, it indicates that the clusters ob-
jects and the clustering is appropriately configured. We
utilize a Euclidean distance method to calculate the SV
in this paper. We define the label flipping attack (LFA)
as follows:
Definition 1 LFA in SCLFA: LFA is a type of at-
tack that the attacker tries to use some algorithms to
modify the label of features and changes the interval of
each sample in a cluster. In this paper, we use the sil-
houette clustering algorithm to implement LFA. To put
it simply, in SCLFA, we assign an interval [-1,1] for
each sample, which indicates whether the sample is in
the correct cluster. If the silhouette value (SV) is neg-
ative, it means that the selected sample is a good can-
didate for flipping the label, and according to the sil-
houette algorithm, it is definitely belonging to another
cluster. Hence, we change the label of such sample. Let
Li be the label of the i-th sample out of n samples in
the dataset. Thus, we can write it as eq. (3):
Li =
{
(xi, yi), SV > 0
(xi, |1− yi|), otherwise
(3)
Algorithm 1 presents the label flipping poisoning attack.
Description of the Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,
we present the proposed method, SDLFA, for the flip-
ping label of the training sample. This method is based
on the K-means clustering algorithm. In this way, we
first create a model based on the K-means algorithm
that divides the X train samples into two clusters and
predicts the label for each sample (lines 1-2). Then,
in line 3, we calculate the Silhouette values for sam-
ples and predicted labels for the samples. As previously
stated, values close to 1 indicate that the sample is fit-
ted in the appropriate cluster, and as the values of Sil-
houette are less than 1 and close to -1, it means that the
sample is clustered incorrectly. In the proposed method,
we flipped the label of samples that have a Silhouette
value less than zero. In this way, we probably have cho-
sen the examples that have the potential to be in the
other cluster (lines 4-8).
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Algorithm 1 Silhouette-based Label Flipping Attack
(SCLFA)
Input: X train , Y train
Output: Poisoned Y train
1: MK ←Make Model with two Clusters Using KMeans
Algorithm
2: Labels←Predict labels of X train using MK
3: S ← Compute Silhouette values using X train using
Labels
4: for each row ∈ X train do
5: if (S[row] ≤ 0) then
6: Poisoned Y train[row] = abs(1− Y train[row])
7: end if
8: end for
9: return Poisoned Y train
4.3 Defensive Strategies
In this subsection, we discuss these countermeasures
against the label flipping attack. In detail, we describe
Label-based Semi-supervised Defense (LSD) and Clustering-
based Semi-supervised Defense (CSD) which are pre-
sented in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively. In this
paper, we assume our data are only partially labeled.
Our defense strategies begins by investigating which
validation data in training samples may have been flipped.
It would then predict new labels for these data and
replace their labels. Fig. 3 shows the overview of the
semi-supervised learning (SSL) model for both defense
strategies.
Fig. 3: Overview of SSL model.
4.3.1 LSD Defense
In this section, we design LSD algorithm to give a prior-
ity between semi-monitoring learning (SML) methods.
In other words, we adopt validation data as inputs of
SML algorithms to predict the label for each sample and
then rank the predicted labels. The goal of the LSD al-
gorithm is to find the samples for which the labels in the
flipped training set are likely to have the correct values.
Then, we need to give the selected data and its labels
to the SSL algorithm. We need to create a validation
set to monitor the training process and select the suit-
able parameters. That is, in the LSD method, we first
rank the data points within each class, and then hold
the label for the points that have the highest rankings.
If no clean set is available, ranking is applied which is
designed based on the multi-way classification neural
network. Hence, Ranking is trained from the original
training dataset. In fact, in this defense mechanism, we
try to learn a binary classifier while clean labels are
available. Then, we separate data containing clean la-
bels and flipped labels. Formally speaking, in this de-
fense strategy, in the first stage, we apply the Label
Propagation (LP) algorithm to assign the labels to un-
labeled data points. Then, in the next stage, we use
Label Spreading (LS) to minimize the noises happen in
labeling the samples. In LSD method, we plan to design
a method which works like an ensemble learning such
that it uses propagation models to predict labels for
flipping. In this way, we provide a two-stage framework
for learning flipped labels. In the following, we describe
LP and LS.
– Label Propagation (LP). LP is a type of semi-
supervised ML algorithm can give a label to the un-
labeled sample data. First, LP gives labels a small
dataset of samples and make classifications. In other
work, LP aims to propose the labels to the unlabeled
data points. That is, LP helps to find the community
structure in real complex networks [5]. LP compared
to the other practical methods in literature has much
lower processing time and could support apriori in-
formation needed about the network structure, and
it does not require any knowledge of data point and
samples before propagation. However, LP could pro-
duce several solutions for each set of data points.
– Label Spreading (LS). LS algorithm is a type of
propagation method that can apply the normalized
graph Laplacian and soft clamping in an affinity ma-
trix to influence on the labels. It also can diminish
the regularization properties of a loss function to and
make it robust against the noise [2]. LS algorithm
repeats on the modified version of a graph of data
points and can normalize the edge weights by com-
puting the normalized graph Laplacian matrix.
LP and LS algorithms create on a kernel of the sys-
tem in which positively effect on the performance of
the algorithm and enhance the chance of scalability of
the problem. To be precise, and as an example, the
RBF kernel can generate a fully connected graph that
can demonstrate a dense matrix. Such big size matrix,
in each iteration, could join with the cost performance
full matrix multiplication calculation and results in in-
creasing the time complexity, which causes a problem
for scalable case studies. In this paper, we fix the prob-
lem by utilizing LP and LS algorithms on a KNN ker-
nel system which provides much more memory-friendly
sparse matrix and can exponentially save on execution
latency.
In the first stage of LSD algorithm, we use valida-
tion set to train the LP and LS algorithms. Then, we
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use these algorithms to predict labels of training set.
At the same time we train the CNN classifier with the
validation data and predict new labels for training set
samples. In the second stage, we use voting between all
available labels, i.e., LP output, Label Spreading, CNN
predicted labels and poisoned labels.
In the second stage of LSD algorithm, we apply a
temporary ensembling for semi-supervised Deep Neural
Network training. Then, we present a semi-supervised
two-stage algorithm for training flipped labels, which
include two main components. We discover and select
some samples from the labeled training set, for which
there are strong indications that their labels are cor-
rect. Afterward, we aim to learn a semi-supervised deep
neural network that only uses the selected labels from
the first previous stage. Finally, the ML model network
can easily classify previously unseen test data. We sum-
marize the proposed LSD countermeasure algorithm in
Algorithm 2.
Description of the Algorithm 2. It presents the
semi-supervised defense, which is based on Label es-
timation. As seen in this algorithm, in lines 3-5, the
label spreading algorithm is applied, which is used to
find labels of training data. The label spreading algo-
rithm is trained using validation data and then created
a model is used to predict labels of training data. Sim-
ilarly, lines 6-8 use the Label Propagation algorithm to
predict training data labels. This algorithm, like the
Label Spreading algorithm, is a semi-supervised algo-
rithm. In lines 9 and 10 of this algorithm, convolutional
neural network as the third part of the ensemble learn-
ing approach is used, which is trained with validation
data and is used to predict the training data label. The
final part of the LSD method is the voting between the
results of the three methods described and the poisoned
label, which is the result of voting as the label for train-
ing samples.
Algorithm 2 Label-based Semi-supervised Defense
(LSD)
Input: X validation, Y validation,X train, Poisoned Y train
Output: YCorrected
1: X ← X train
2: Y ← Y validation
3: Ms ←Make Model using LS algorithm
4: Fit the Ms Model on X and Y
5: Ls ← Predict labels of X train using Ms
6: Mp ← Make Model using LP algorithm
7: Fit the Mp Model on X and Y
8: Lp ← Predict labels of X train using Mp
9: Mcnn ← Make Model using proposed CNN algorithm
10: Lcnn ← Predict labels of X train using Mcnn
11: YCorrected = Voting(YCorrected, Ls, Lp, Lcnn)
12: return YCorrected
4.3.2 CSD Defense
The main idea behind this approach is to use clustering
techniques to correct flipped labels. As each of the clus-
tering methods has its specific measure, in this method
it is suggested to use the voting between the label de-
termined by different clustering methods for determines
the label of the flipped samples. Hence, we use four in-
dices to analyze the Accuracy of our generated clusters
and the predicted one and identify the most likely ad-
versarial examples and flip their labels.
Description of Algorithm 3. In this algorithm, we
explain the CSD method. In lines 1-3 of this algorithm,
we use the proposed CNN model and validation data
and predict the labels of the training data. Lines 4 to
7, the algorithm describes four cluster metrics, namely
RI, MI, HM, and FMI and compute their values. Each
of these metrics is a measure for the Accuracy of clus-
tering. The main idea behind this approach is that the
training samples are labeled in such a way that the
mentioned measure does not differ significantly from
the values calculated from the validation data. There-
fore, in lines 8-16, we add one sample of the training
data to the validation dataset, calculate the values of
the clustering with four metrics , and compare them
with the base values. If the difference is less than 0.1
(i.e., we consider as a threshold), then we consider the
sample to be properly labeled. As a result, the output of
this algorithm is the labeled sample which can be used
as a validation data and selected sample for training
the ML model.
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Algorithm 3 Clustering-based Semi-supervised De-
fense (CSD)
Input: X validation, Y validation,X train, Poisoned Y train
Output: YCorrected
1: X ← X validation
2: Mcnn ← Make Model Using proposed convolutional neu-
ral network
3: YCorrected ← predict labels of X train using Mcnn
4: R←Compute Rand Index using X and YCorrected
5: M ←Compute Mutual Information using X and
YCorrected
6: H ←Compute Homogeneity Metric using X and
YCorrected
7: F ←Compute Fowlkes-Mallows Index using X and
YCorrected
8: for each row ∈ X train do
9: X temp← X validation+ row
10: Compute Rtemp ,Mtemp ,Htemp ,Ftemp
11: S ← |((Rtemp − R) + (Mtemp −M) + (Htemp − H) +
(Ftemp − F ))|
12: if (S ≤ 0.1) then
13: X ← X + row
14: YCorrected ← YCorrected+Label related to row
15: end if
16: end for
17: return YCorrected
The indices are defined as below.
– Rand Index (RI): Rand measure/index is a sta-
tistical index to calculate the similarity between two
data clustering [27]. It is a value between zero and
one such that zero indicating that two sets of clus-
tered data do not have any pair point and one indi-
cating that the data clustering is the same. Also, RI
can be used to adjust a group for elements that we
called them adjusted Rand index. In other words, RI
is a metric of the Accuracy of two sets of data points,
which represents the frequency of occurrence of total
pairs. Formally, speaking, RI presents the probabil-
ity of how can we randomly select two pair X1 and
X2 in two partitions of the same big set.
– Mutual Information (MI): MI, or information
gain is a measure to realize the amount of informa-
tion and dependency between two separate variables
by observing them [3]. It is a type of entropy of a
random variable that can understand the joint dis-
tribution of a pair data points which calculates by
the product of the marginal distribution of those pair
samples. Since the data we are dealing with are fallen
in the group of discrete data with discrete distribu-
tion, we can calculate the I MI of two jointly discrete
random variable X1 and X2 as follows:
I(X1, X2) =
∑
x1∈X1
∑
x2∈X2
p(X1,X2)(x1, x2) log2(
p(X1,X2)(x1, x2)
pX1(x1)pX2(x2)
) (4)
where p(X1,X2) is a joint probability mass function for
the two samples of X1 and X2 and pX1 is a marginal
probability of sample X1 and pX2 is a marginal prob-
ability of sample X2.
– Homogeneity Metric (HM): This metric uses for
validating the data points which are members of a
single class. HM is independent of being changed the
score value of data point when a permutation of the
class or labels are applied [16]. We can define HM
values as HM as follows:
HM = 1− H(YT |YPR)
H(YT )
(5)
where HM can be between 0 and 1. Note that low
values ofHM explains a low homogeneity, vice-versa.
If we have a sample data Y , we define YPR, YT are
the predicted and the corrected value for that sam-
ple, hence, H(YT ) is HM value for that sample when
it is correctly placed and predicted to be placed in
one single class, respectively. Besides, the H(YT |YPR)H(YT )
indicates that the predicted sample is not placed cor-
rectly in a single class. We aim to approach this frac-
tion smaller and reach it to zero (HM→ 1). We can
achieve this goal when we reduce the knowledge of
YPR and diminish the uncertainty of YT that results
in the fraction above become smaller, and we have
HM around 1.
– Fowlkes-Mallows Index (FMI): FowlkesMallows
Index (FMI) metric is a popular metric to under-
stand the similarity between two generated clusters,
whether hierarchical or benchmark classification clus-
ters [14]. The higher similarity between two clusters
(created cluster and the benchmark one) indicates
higher FMI values. FMI is an accurate metric uses
to evaluate the unrelated data and also is reliable
even with added noises to the data results.
4.4 Computational Complexity
In following section, we evaluate computational com-
plexity analysis on the presented attack and defensive
methods. Assume that the number of samples inX train
and X validation are n and m, respectively. We list the
computational complexity of the methods. So, we have
– Time Complexity of SCLFA Attack
Focusing on SCLFA, the computation of all possi-
ble configurations in line 1-2 of Algorithm 1 cre-
ates a model based on the K-means method and
predicts the correct n training samples, results in
O(n2×k). Since in this method, k = 2, the time com-
plexity is in the order of O(n2). In line 3 of this al-
gorithm, Silhouette values are computed for n train-
ing data samples, which has a complexity of O(n2).
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Lines 4-8 of the algorithm include a for loop that
performs the correction of the m validating labels
and has a complexity of O(m). Overall, the compu-
tational complexity of the Algorithm 1 is in the order
of O(n2) +O(n2) +O(m)=O(n2), ∀ n m.
– Time Complexity of LSD Defense
Focusing on LSD, the computation of Algorithm 2 di-
rectly relates to the LS method, which has a complex-
ity of O(n). Similarly, in lines 6-8, the model is based
on the LP algorithm, which has a complexity ofO(n).
Then, lines 9 and 10 present CNN model creating, ac-
cording to [15], which has a computational complex-
ity of all convolutional layers. CNN computational
complexity is O(Σdi=1n(l−1)×s2l ×m2l ), where l is the
index of a convolutional layer; d is the depth (num-
ber of convolutional layers); nl is the width or the
number of filters in the lth layer–n(l1) is the num-
ber of input channels of the l-th layer; sl is the spa-
tial size (length) of the filter and ml is the spatial
size of the output feature of CNN which has a time
complexity in the order of O(n3). Then, we performs
voting between results that has a complexity of O(1)
(line 11). Overall, the computational complexity of
LSD defense algorithm is O(n) + O(n) + O(n3) +
O(1)=O(n3).
– Time Complexity of CSD Defense
Focusing on CSD, the computation of Algorithm 3
relies on CNN model construction based validation
data (lines 1-2). Then, we predict the label for train-
ing data samples based on this generated ML model.
Therefore, the computational complexity of this part
is in the order of O(n3). Focusing on the RI, MI , HM
and FMI clustering metric calculations, they have a
complexity ofO(n) (lines 4-7). Then, we calculate the
values of these parameters for m samples. Hence, the
complexity of this loop of the CSD algorithm is in the
order of O(n×m) (lines 8-16). As a result, the overall
computational complexity of CSD defense method is
O(n×m) +O(n3) +O(n)=O(n3),∀ n >> m.
5 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we report the results of our proposed
attack and defense algorithms in different scenarios:
with feature selection consideration (WFS) and with-
out feature selection consideration (WoFS). Given the
two scenarios, we conduct our experiments on our at-
tack (SCLFA) and defense algorithms (LSD and CSD)
against KNN-based Semi-Supervised Defense (KSSD) [26].
The source code of the paper is available in Github [31].
5.1 Simulation setup
We describe the test metrics, datasets, features, classi-
fication parameter, and comparison defense algorithm
below.
5.1.1 Test metrics
To provide a comprehensive evaluations of our attack
and defense algorithms, we use the following indices:
Accuracy, Precision, Recall, False positive rate (FPR),
True negative rate (TNR), miss rate (FNR), F1-score,
and area under cover (AUC):
– Accuracy: Accuracy metric is defined in:
Acc =
Ω + χ
Ω + χ+ Λ + ν
(6)
where Ω is true positive; χ is true negative; Λ is false
positive, and ν is false negative metrics.
– Precision: Precision is the fraction of relevant sam-
ples between the retrieved samples which is shown in
Precision =
Ω
Ω + Λ
(7)
– Recall: The Recall is expressed in
Recall =
Ω
Ω + ν
(8)
– F1-Score: This metric defines as a harmonic mean
of Precision and Recall which is defined as
F1− Score = 1
1
Recall
+ 1
Precision
=
2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
(9)
– False Positive Rate (FPR): This metric repre-
sents a ratio between the number of negative events
incorrectly classified as positive (false positives) and
the total number of actual negative events. This met-
ric is described in equation (10):
FPR =
Λ
Λ + χ
(10)
– Area Under Curve (AUC): AUC measures the
trade off between misclassification rate and FPR.
This metrics can be calculated as (11):
AUC =
1
2
(
Ω
Ω + Λ
+
χ
χ+ Λ
)
(11)
– False Negative Rate (FNR): This metric is a
method for determining the case that the condition
does not hold, while in fact it does. In this work, we
also called it miss rate. This metrics can be calcu-
lated as (12):
FNR =
ν
ν + Ω
(12)
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5.1.2 Datasets
Our experiments utilized the following three datasets:
– Drebin dataset: This dataset is an Android exam-
ple collection that we can apply directly. The Drebin
dataset includes 118,505 applications/samples from
various Android sources [4].
– Contagio dataset: it consists of 11,960 mobile mal-
ware samples and 16,800 benign samples [1].
– Genome dataset: This dataset is an Android example
which is supported by the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF) project of the United States. From Au-
gust 2010 to October 2011, the authors collected about
1,200 samples of Android malware from different cat-
egories as a genome dataset [18].
5.1.3 Features
In this paper, we consider various malicious sample fea-
tures like Permissions, APIs and Intents. We summarize
them as follows:
– Permission: Permission is a essential profile of an
Android application (apk) file that includes informa-
tion about the application. The Android operating
system processes these Permission files before instal-
lation.
– API: API feature monitors various calls to APIs on
an Android OS, such as sending SMS or accessing a
user’s location.
– Intent: Intent feature applies to represent the com-
munication between different components which is
known as a medium.
5.1.4 Parameter setting
We rank the features to better manage the huge amount
of features using the RandomForestRegressor algorithm.
Then, we repeat our experiments for 300 manifest fea-
tures with higher ranks to determine the optimal num-
ber of features for modification in each method. In each
test, we randomly consider 60% of the dataset as train-
ing samples, 20% as validation samples and 20% as test-
ing samples. We run our experiments on an 8-core Intel
Core i7 with speed 4 GHz with 16 GB RAM on an OS
Win10 64-bit.
5.1.5 Comparison of defense algorithms
We compare our proposed algorithms to defend against
label flipping attacks with KNN-based Semi-Supervised
Defense (KSSD) [26] and GAN-based Defense [30]. The
comparison results show that our proposed methods
are more robust in detecting Flipping Label attacks.
In the KSSD method, authors adopt K nearest neigh-
bor (KNN) method to mitigate the effect of label flip-
ping attacks. A relabeling mechanism for suspected ma-
licious malware is suggested. The KNN algorithm uses
the training set to assign a label to each sample. The
aim is to ensure the homogeneity of the label between
the close examples, especially in areas that are far from
the decision boundary. In the training set, authors first
select K nearest neighbors using the Euclidean dis-
tance. Then, if the fraction of the data points that are
among the most commonly enclosed labels in K are
equal or greater than the threshold of t with 0.5 ≤ t ≤ 1
they select them. The training sample available in the
K nearest neighbor is relabeled with the most common
label. Given that we only have two types of labels in
detecting malware, they assign the dominant label in
K to the nearest neighbor to the sample. Algorithm 4
presents the KSSD defense.
Algorithm 4 KNN-based Semi-Supervised Defense
(KSSD) [26]
Input: training set S, Threshold t
Output: S
1: for i = 1 ≤ m do
2: KNN ←−Find K nearest neighbor for sample i
3: F ←− Find the fraction of samples in KNN with most
frequency
4: if F > t then
5: yi= label with most frequency in KNN
6: end if
7: end for
8: return S
We indicate that poisoning sample points that are
far from the decision boundary are likely to be rela-
beled, and reduce the negative performance consequences
on the classification algorithm. Although the algorithm
gains validation of genuine points at the same time, i.e.,
in areas where the two classes overlap (especially for
values of t close to 0.5), we can have a similar amount
of the correct points that are labeled in two classes,
and it confirms that the KSSD label correction solu-
tions presented in Algorithm 4 must be the same for
the two classes. Therefore, this type labeling shall not
considerably influenced the classification algorithm.
Another comparison made in this paper is the GAN-
based defense presented in [30]. Algorithm 5 illus-
trates the proposed method in this study. This algo-
rithm works by generating new samples to train the
machine learning model again. Specifically, in this pa-
per, we use the GAN as a synthetic data generator set.
GAN has two functions called Generator and Discrim-
inator. The former one can modify the less likely mal-
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ware samples. To do so, in the training phase, it selects
one random feature from the highest ranked features
with zero value. Then, it changes the selected feature
value to one to generate new sample. In the latter func-
tion, the GAN use this function as a classifier to pre-
dict the class variable. It modifies the features until
the discriminator function is cheated and labels such a
sample among the benign samples. Besides, we gather
the wrongly estimated malware samples into a synthetic
data generator set. Besides, we use 80% of the synthetic
data generator set with the training dataset to update
the AML model. We use the remaining synthetic data
generator samples (i.e., 20% of the data samples) with
the test dataset to test/analyze the classification. It is
found that the proposed methods even outperform the
GAN-based method, since the proposed GAN is only
flipping-focused research with respect to the important
features of decision making, while the proposed meth-
ods in this paper are based on the value of labels.
Algorithm 5 GAN: pseudo-code of the GAN defense [30]
Input: training set S(X, Y ), X∗, Y ∗, λ
Output: Modelnew
1: Modelpoison ← Fit a model on Xtrn using LR
2: Lesslikely ← Fit 10% model of Xm with KNN to
Modelpoison
3: for each x ∈ Lesslikely do
4: xnew ← x
5: while xnew ∈Modelpoison Classify as M do
6: xnew ← Add ranked(λ) features from Xb ∪ xnew
7: end while
8: syntheticdata ← syntheticdata ∪ xnew
9: end for
10: Modelnew ← Fit Model on Xtrn ∪ syntheticdata
11: Ycorrected ← Use Modelnew to predict label of X
12: S ←X and related label(Ycorrected)
13: return S
5.2 Experimental results
In this section, we test our presented attack algorithm
(SCLFA) on our originally trained classifiers and vali-
date our defenses algorithms (LSD and CSD) against
adversarial label flipped examples (KSSD) and GAN-
based synthetic data generator on three above Android
malware datasets.
5.2.1 Comparing methods based on Precision, Recall,
F1-score
In this test scenario, we aim to compare the defense al-
gorithms (see Fig. 4) and attack method compares with
the data without triggering the data, i.e., no-attack (see
Fig. 5). Specifically, in Fig. 4, we provide Precision, Re-
call, and F1-score values for the different defense algo-
rithms. Both Recall (Sensitivity) and Precision (Speci-
ficity) metrics indicate generated errors. The Recall is a
measure that could show the rate of total detected mal-
ware. That is, the proportion of those correctly iden-
tified is the sum of all malware (i.e., those that are
correctly identified by the malware plus those that are
incorrectly detected by benign). Our goal in this sec-
tion is to design a model with high Recall that is more
appropriate to identify malware. To give more insight,
Figs. 4a- 4c, Figs. 4d- 4f, and Figs. 4g- 4i report the
Permission, API and Intent data for the Drebin, Con-
tagio, and Genome datasets, respectively. Three con-
siderations hold in this figures. i) the value of Pre-
cision/Recall and even F1-score for KSSD algorithm
and GAN-based algorithm are clearly lower than our
LSD and CSD methods (as expected) and it confirms
that our proposed defense algorithm is able to identify
the more benign samples compared to other methods
correctly. ii) CSD algorithm have higher Precision and
Recall values compared to LSD algorithm. iii) in this
feature group, our proposed algorithms have a higher
Precision/Recall/F1-score value for Intent type features
in all datasets compared to two other feature sets in
which confirms our defense algorithm can detect more
benign samples correctly in different data samples.
Focusing on the attack consequences, Fig. 5 presents
the Precision, Recall and F1-score values for our attack
algorithm, SCLFA, and the similar data when there is
no any attack triggered for the ranked selected features
and all three datasets with full features. In this fig-
ure, we understand that our attack strategy can com-
pletely fool the ML model and impose to falsify classi-
fication and exponentially decreases the Precision and
Recall value. It can be seen that the diminishing rate
is about 45% for Intent features in all three datasets
and its ratio is higher for Drebin dataset (see the Preci-
sion/Recall pair bars in Fig. 5c). It is considering that
the feature selection has a positive influence on the ML
performance. From the attacker point of view, it is es-
sential to impact negatively the ML model classifica-
tion ability. Thus, our attack strategy gives the lead for
such cases, and its adverse effects are more apparent
in Contagio API features, where SCLFA influences on
both selected features and full feature scenarios and can
misclassify about 23% of the samples (see the pair bars
in Fig. 5d).
5.2.2 Comparing methods based on FPR and Accuracy
In this part, we present the FPR and Accuracy values
for the attack and defense algorithms for nine states,
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Fig. 4: Comparison between DEFENSE algorithms with reference to Precision, Recall, and F1-Score for API, Intent and
Permission features in various datasets.
which consists of three features and three datasets and
show them in Fig. 6. The attack algorithm aims to in-
crease the FPR rate, and defense algorithm seeks to
improve the Accuracy and decrease the FPR rate ac-
cordingly. Considering these points, we evaluate the al-
gorithms on two mentioned scenarios: considering full
features (labeled ”-F”) and feature selection scenario
(labeled as ”-Selc”).
Focusing on Fig. 6a, we compare our attack algo-
rithm (SCLFA) with the no attack mode for two men-
tioned scenarios. As we can understand from this figure,
our SCLFA label flipping method compared to the no
attack mode pose problem for all 9 states (i.e., listed in
the x-axis of the figure) and results in lower Accuracy
to all feature types and their major drastic are higher in
Intent features for all datasets (see the ‘X’ shape marks
in lower part of Fig. 6a). In this case, the Accuracy has
dropped more than 20% compared to the absence of an
attack. It confirms that the proposed attack method is
more successful in attack to the Intents features. In all
datasets, the algorithms behave roughly the same, and
the reduction of the Accuracy of the API is more in-
tense. As we see, the Accuracy of the proposed attack
method in the case of using all data is lower than that
of the 300 features.
Focusing on Fig. 6b, we compare the Accuracy of de-
fense algorithms for full-featured and selected features
scenarios. In this figure, almost in all cases, the CSD
method can provide higher Accuracy than other de-
fense algorithms (see the blue mark points in Fig. 6b)
and is fallen in a range of (62%,98%). Therefore, it can
detect more benign samples. The CSD method is more
accurate than LSD in all 9 states, and its average Ac-
curacy is about 95%, 97.6%, and 98.5% for full feature
consideration scenario in Drebin, Contagio and Gnome
datasets, respectively while this value for KSSD defense
algorithm is about 80%, 79%,and 77%, respectively.
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Fig. 5: Comparison between ATTACK algorithms with reference to Precision, Recall, and F1-Score for API, Intent and
Permission features in various datasets.
Focusing on Fig. 6c, the FPR value of our attack
algorithm (SCLFA) is compared to the time we have
no attack in datasets. Concerning the Intent features
in all datasets, the SCLFA algorithm, it has an FPR
value and can fool more malware samples compared to
other features in all datasets. In other words, increasing
the FPR values means increasing the number of false
positives, which is the goal of an attacker, and as can
be seen from the comparison of Fig. 6c with Fig. 6a,
by increasing FPR, the Accuracy value decreases. As
a result, the results of these two figures confirm each
other.
Focusing on Fig. 6d, we compare the FPR values of
defense algorithms. From this figure, we can understand
that the CSD algorithm tries to decrease the FPR val-
ues more than two other defense algorithms in most of
the states. It is important to note that having high Ac-
curacy does not mean that the defense algorithm can
successfully protect the dataset against the poisoning
data, and it is essential to decrease the FPR in that
state. Hence, we need to point-to-point check each state
of this figure with a similar state in Fig. 6b. From these
comparisons, we conclude that the CSD algorithm per-
forms better than LSD and KSSD.
5.2.3 Comparing methods based on FNR and AUC
In this part of our work, we compare the AUC and
FNR values for attack and defense algorithms over three
datasets using three different feature sets. In Table 2,
we present these results for two scenarios: with feature
selection (WFS) and full features or without feature se-
lection (WoFS). Concerning the FNR concept, it shows
the misclassification rate of data in a dataset. In the
flipping attack, the FNR rate increases, and it decreases
with defense algorithms. Also, the AUC and FNR val-
ues indicate that by performing a flipping attack on the
labels, FNR values increase and AUC values decrease.
On Defending Against Label Flipping Attacks on Malware Detection Systems 15
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
D
S1-A
PI
D
S1-Perm
.
D
S1-Intent
D
S2-A
PI
D
S2-Perm
.
D
S2-Intent
D
S3-A
PI
D
S3-Perm
.
D
S3-Intent
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
no-attack-F
SCLFA-F
no-attack-S
SCLFA-S
(a) Accuracy Attack
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
D
S1-A
PI
D
S1-Perm
.
D
S1-Intent
D
S2-A
PI
D
S2-Perm
.
D
S2-Intent
D
S3-A
PI
D
S3-Perm
.
D
S3-Intent
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
KSSD-F
LSD-F
CSD-F
GAN-F
KSSD-S
LSD-S
CSD-S
GAN-S
(b) Accuracy Defense
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
D
S1-A
PI
D
S1-Perm
.
D
S1-Intent
D
S2-A
PI
D
S2-Perm
.
D
S2-Intent
D
S3-A
PI
D
S3-Perm
.
D
S3-Intent
FP
R
 (%
)
no-attack-F
SCLFA-F
no-attack-S
SCLFA-S
(c) FPR Attack
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
D
S1-A
PI
D
S1-Perm
.
D
S1-Intent
D
S2-A
PI
D
S2-Perm
.
D
S2-Intent
D
S3-A
PI
D
S3-Perm
.
D
S3-Intent
FP
R
 (%
)
KSSD-F
LSD-F
CSD-F
GAN-F
KSSD-S
LSD-S
CSD-S
GAN-S
(d) FPR Defense
Fig. 6: Comparison between attack and defense algorithms with reference to Accuracy and FPR for API, Intent and Permission
features in various datasets.(DS1=Drebin; DS2=Contagio; DS3=Genome) and -F= full feature ; -S= selected features.
The AUC and FNR values is based on the equations
(11) and (12) which relates to True Negative (Λ) and
True positive (Ω). FNR and AUC values with increas-
ing FPR rates during an attack increase the Ω value
and is pleasant for the attacker. Defense strategies try
to decrease the FNR or miss rate of malware samples
corrections and help to increase the AUC. In Table 2,
we understand that both of our defense algorithms have
higher AUC and lower FNR rate for all datasets, and
they confirm our recently mentioned points.
5.2.4 Computational complexity comparisons
In this part of the paper, we compare the computational
complexity of our attack and the defense algorithms
against (KSSD) [26] and GAN-based Defense [30]. Ta-
ble 3 compares the time required for the testing phase of
various datasets and different features among the dif-
ferent proposed algorithms for ranked features using
RF and without feature selection methods. In this ta-
ble, focusing on the defense algorithms, the implemen-
tation of KSSD defense is the fastest compared to LSD,
CSD, and GAN-based algorithms. The reason behind it
is that it randomly selects and modifies the label of the
features. However, its Accuracy is much lower than LSD
and CSD algorithms (see the curves in Fig. 6b). How-
ever, both LSD and CSD algorithms require processing
of the DL algorithm on the malicious dataset, with the
LSD and GAN being the slowest method among the
four methods in correcting the labels of poisoning sam-
ples.
Focusing on the computational complexity of ranked
features scenario, we can understand that the LSD and
CSD methods, running faster in Intents and Permis-
sions features and these results are even quicker when
we compared them with API features cases. We can
conclude that the distribution of API features may re-
quire more computations in calculating LSD and CSD,
and this is a normal behavior of the algorithms. Because
in the feature selection, we select 300 API features that
have the highest rank based on the RF feature selec-
tion algorithm, and this covers about 95% of the API
features from every data sets, but the selection of 300
features from Intents and Permission intends selecting
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Table 2: AUC and FNR Comparisons in percent (%) for presented algorithms in various features, datasets in two test scenarios:
WFS and WoFS. WFS= with feature selection; WoFS= without feature selection.
Other ML Metrics Datasets
Ratio (%) Drebin Contagio Genome
Algorithms File
Type
WoFS WFS WoFS WFS WoFS WFS
FNR AUC FNR AUC FNR AUC FNR FNR FNR AUC FNR AUC
Permission 10.71 82.64 11.71 60.56 6.67 59.06 23.79 60.76 5.95 96.21 3.46 68.80
API 16.59 83.22 12.43 80.78 29.70 94.35 25.75 92.91 32.29 74.40 25.86 70.24
A
tt
a
c
k
SCLFA
Intents 49.21 62.97 7.94 42.28 45.83 95.87 3.21 43.55 45.22 94.26 0.31 48.32
Permission 2.17 93.90 2.33 70.77 1.65 80.32 0.81 61.64 1.29 93.89 2.05 68.65
API 6.62 90.77 5.65 88.44 6.59 95.34 11.13 94.03 7.40 96.59 12.15 55.23LSD
Intents 10.20 91.97 0.43 43.70 6.28 89.42 0.75 50.07 7.27 91.82 0.53 50.41
Permission 1.44 95.08 3.22 73.98 0.94 93.18 0.84 91.36 1.33 97.06 1.58 69.07
API 2.53 98.40 2.04 98.28 1.47 95.05 0.42 91.39 0.84 98.42 0.65 96.83CSD
Intents 2 93.74 0.54 45.60 1.75 93.18 0.55 50.31 1.10 94.12 0.40 51.43
Permission 48.95 47.00 11.06 70.93 47.91 0.54 25.28 61.19 33.62 55.49 3.51 69.14
D
e
fe
n
se
s
API 11.11 87.37 12.46 78.92 16.96 93.80 20.78 95.58 27.26 59.77 24.78 70.76GANX [30]
Intents 87.35 8.96 6.99 43.50 33.46 57.75 2.10 71.60 26.36 60.84 0.57 83.29
Permission 4.95 91.17 11.58 70.59 3.53 61.88 25.19 90.94 5.60 90.91 3.72 68.57
API 10.78 86.27 12.46 78.92 19.81 94.45 23.27 94.25 19.91 72.48 24.73 71KSSD [26]
Intents 39.10 70.93 6.91 42.39 35.11 89.02 2.35 44.58 41.79 90.04 0.30 50.51
at most 20% of the main features. Therefore, the com-
putational complexity of the proposed algorithm over
the API features when the 300 features are chosen is
close to the state in which all the features are used.
Focusing on the computational complexity of full
features comparisons scenario, we can see that since
the number of API features is much less than the In-
tents and Permissions, so the computational time of
proposed algorithms is less on these features. Similarly,
we can conceive the same results for the computational
complexity of proposed algorithms on the Permission
features than the results of Intents features (see the
Permission row values for WFoS cases in all datasets
in Table 3). Also, from Table 3 we can realize that the
proposed methods are slower than the KSSD method.
However, as we understand from the comparisons of ML
metrics, the KSSD method is a weak method using for
label flipping attack (LFA) compared to our proposed
defense algorithms.
Additionally, the computational time of CSD with
taking into account the high Accuracy of this method
and its take less running time compared to the LSD
method. So, this behavior converts the CSD method
into an attractive way to defend against the LFA. An-
other point to be added about the time of the LSD
method is to consider the structure of the method in
which a CNN network is used, whose time complexity
is at least O(n3) and this can be the major drawback
when it compares to the CSD algorithm.
6 Discussions
In the following, we explain the achievements and some
constraints on our attack and defense algorithms. From
the results, we can conclude that the proposed meth-
ods based on semi-supervised learning can modify the
flipped labels to increase the Accuracy of classification
methods, including CNN. Despite the promising results
achieved by our attack and defense algorithms, it is
clear that our approaches have some intrinsic limita-
tions. Firstly, the critical point in the proposed methods
is the need for more calculations. Notably, the use of a
CNN in the LSD method increases the computational
complexity of this method. Secondly, the proposed mal-
ware detection algorithms implementing static features,
the features are binary and are in the sparse matrix.
Hence, it is easier to calculate clustering measures. How-
ever, for other applications, it may not be possible to
perform calculations of the clustering measures efficiently.
Another limitation of our defense methods is the
classification algorithm used in this paper. Formally
speaking, in this work, we design a three-layer CNN,
which has high Accuracy and use CNN to investigate
the results of the proposed algorithms. The classifica-
tion Accuracy with other classification algorithms is an-
other issue that needs to be addressed. The Accuracy
and FPR in the comparison figures indicate that when
the feature selection applied (second scenario), the pro-
posed methods still have acceptable values for these two
measurements, but LSD and CSD algorithms running
faster than the case that testing of the full features is
employed (as expected and visible).
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Table 3: Computational complexity comparisons in seconds (s) for presented algorithms in various features, datasets in two
test scenarios: WFS and WoFS. WFS= with feature selection; WoFS= without feature selection.
Computational Complexity Datasets
Time (s) Drebin Contagio Genome
Algorithms File Type WoFS WFS WoFS WFS WoFS WFS
Permission 140.09 4.04 87.66 3.56 130.10 3.11
API 7.14 4.71 4.84 3.88 4.21 3.74
A
tt
a
c
k
SCLFA
Intents 150.99 3.83 209.89 2.87 106.07 2.92
Permission 385.79 101.16 417.62 107.81 348.62 106.02
API 123.91 114.64 117.35 112.75 109.87 105.38LSD
Intents 963.97 105.17 747.98 96.81 501.85 108.10
Permission 148.15 11.50 118.77 9.51 123.45 9.16
API 21.76 15.77 17.22 13.27 14.56 12.77
D
e
fe
n
se
s
CSD
Intents 281.83 11.26 235.24 9.21 198.63 11.42
Permission 95.90 5.20 83.91 4.15 90.83 5.16
API 9.95 7.59 8.53 6.46 8.41 6.42KSSD [26]
Intents 210.99 5.17 206.77 4.12 146.55 5.12
Permission 425.13 211.64 471.33 194.55 394.65 176.38
API 94.23 67.45 86.56 64.75 75.34 57.14GAN [30]
Intents 515.41 276.54 495.32 209.21 436.97 196.45
7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we design an attack and two defense al-
gorithms which target Android malware detection sys-
tem, namely a Silhouette-based label flipping attack
(SCLFA), a label-based semi-supervised defense algo-
rithm (LSD), and a clustering-based semi-supervised
defense (CSD) algorithm. We compare our defense al-
gorithms against the KNN-based label flipping attack
on Android mobile dataset using three public datasets,
i.e., the Drebin, Genome, and Contagio datasets, us-
ing different API, Intent and Permission features. We
test our models on a CNN classification algorithm. The
comparison of proposed CSD and LSD methods against
the KSSD method reveals that the proposed methods
have higher Accuracy than the KSSD, while the KSSD
algorithm is faster. To be precise, the CSD algorithm,
although slightly slower than the KSSD algorithm, but
since in many cases, it has approximately 19% higher
Accuracy than the KSSD and has about 15% lower FPR
compared to the KSSD. For future work, we suggest
using semi-supervised methods based on deep learning
techniques, such as autoencoder and various types of
GAN networks. They can be used along with clustering
techniques. Using these methods as an ensemble learn-
ing can provide excellent results against label flipping
attacks.
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Appendix
In this section, we explain why we select CNN classi-
fier as the main classification algorithm applied in the
paper. To this end, we tested our attack and defense
algorithms against the KSSD [26], and GANX [30] de-
fense algorithms on present various classifications algo-
rithms namely RF, SVM, DR, NN and CNN and com-
pute accuracy and FPR metrics for different features
to study on different datasets. Table A.1 presents the
results. As the results presented in this table, with the
change of the classification algorithm, there is no sig-
nificant difference in the superiority of one method to
another. However,from this table, we conclude that the
accuracy of CNN classification method for all the attack
and defense algorithms compared to other classification
methods in all datasets for all features is higher. Simi-
larly, the FPR rate of CNN method is lower compared
with other classification methods. As a result, we select
CNN method to design our ML model for attack and
defense algorithms.
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Table A.1: Testing the proposed methods (attacks and defenses) using training classification algorithms tested on API,
Permission and Intent features in various datasets. No-A= No attack algorithm; RF= random forest; NN= neural network;
SVM= support vector machine; DT= decision tree.
Drebin
RF SVM DT NN CNN
Algs. Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR
No-A 98.00 3.81 98.40 2.08 97.85 2.25 97.78 4.58 98.45 2.70
SCLFA 83.03 28.81 83.37 27.58 82.24 27.63 82.75 29.92 83.42 28.08
A
P
I LSD 90.92 17.91 91.29 16.46 90.74 16.56 90.67 18.87 91.34 17.01
CSD 97.39 3.63 97.78 1.90 97.23 2.07 97.16 4.40 97.83 2.52
KSSD [26] 82.27 31.56 82.61 30.38 82.06 30.42 81.99 32.70 82.66 30.87
GANX [30] 82.82 28.31 82.90 28.38 82.54 27.72 84.67 25.79 83.30 29.07
No-A 86.61 39.86 87.02 38.31 87.71 39.02 87.23 38.36 87.07 38.76
SCLFA 74.97 59.97 75.38 58.52 76.23 58.44 75.59 58.88 75.42 58.88
P
e
r
m
is
s
io
n
LSD 85.85 45.10 86.26 43.59 85.90 43.04 86.47 43.71 86.30 44.01
CSD 86.59 40.03 87.00 38.49 87.52 39.46 87.21 38.54 87.04 38.93
KSSD [26] 79.31 44.41 79.72 42.88 80.70 42.78 79.93 43.00 79.77 43.31
GANX [30] 79.86 45.69 80.00 40.89 83.23 43.22 82.46 39.68 80.34 43.03
No-A 78.26 85.81 78.53 85.37 77.76 86.39 77.93 85.62 78.38 86.10
SCLFA 68.75 87.04 69.01 86.68 68.25 87.54 68.41 86.87 68.86 87.30
In
t
e
n
t
s LSD 75.50 87.32 75.76 86.93 74.99 87.85 75.16 87.13 75.61 87.59
CSD 77.98 86.18 78.24 85.74 77.48 86.76 77.64 85.98 78.10 86.47
KSSD [26] 70.68 88.66 70.94 88.28 70.17 89.20 70.34 98.94 70.79 88.94
GANX [30] 70.53 92.07 71.22 86.13 72.56 88.16 67.96 98.90 72.82 89.21
Contagio
RF SVM DT NN CNN
Algs. Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR
No-A 98.45 2.70 98.45 6.72 98.27 6.38 97.11 10.36 97.95 12.90
SCLFA 75.97 9.52 75.79 9.28 74.98 11.17 75.48 15.84 75.62 12.32
A
P
I LSD 89.28 7.84 89.10 7.54 88.60 8.02 88.78 14.08 88.92 10.60
CSD 98.39 12.61 98.21 12.46 97.42 14.08 97.89 19.06 98.04 15.47
KSSD [26] 78.44 7.28 78.25 6.96 77.67 8.31 77.94 99.72 78.08 10.03
GANX [30] 79.11 9.27 78.60 0.86 80.49 9.46 80.72 99.67 80.43 7.84
No-A 98.30 12.02 98.30 8.61 98.87 10.73 97.60 18.10 97.95 15.02
SCLFA 72.09 65.40 72.09 62.61 72.15 68.14 71.39 73.93 71.74 69.67
P
e
r
m
is
s
io
n
LSD 92.83 65.40 92.83 62.61 93.29 68.14 92.13 73.93 92.48 69.67
CSD 98.07 12.61 98.07 9.20 98.63 11.36 97.37 18.71 97.72 15.62
KSSD [26] 70.89 64.81 82.30 8.22 72.43 42.89 70.19 73.31 70.54 69.07
GANX [30] 70.86 74.68 82.52 7.38 75.11 43.89 73.93 56.29 70.54 68.69
No-A 90.43 92.81 90.43 92.81 91.75 75.07 90.37 85.87 96.84 29.13
SCLFA 80.49 98.11 80.49 98.11 81.80 87.50 80.51 93.75 86.89 61.55
In
t
e
n
t
s LSD 89.06 93.24 89.06 93.24 90.43 77.00 89.01 86.90 95.47 35.77
CSD 90.11 94.03 90.11 94.03 91.43 76.27 90.05 87.02 96.52 30.54
KSSD [26] 81.92 96.98 81.92 96.98 83.24 86.06 81.93 92.53 88.33 59.18
GANX [30] 82.09 90.09 82.27 92.58 81.51 89.36 84.16 75.34 91.49 49.46
Gnome
RF SVM DT NN CNN
Algs. Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR Acc FPR
No-A 99.37 4.08 99.16 4.96 98.59 5.04 98.89 8.02 99.52 2.94
SCLFA 71.97 53.88 71.76 55.37 71.55 50.84 71.49 54.58 72.12 54.20
A
P
I LSD 84.66 83.45 84.45 86.62 86.46 48.55 84.18 81.48 84.81 85.51
CSD 98.83 6.94 98.62 7.85 97.03 8.02 92.76 46.67 98.98 5.88
KSSD [26] 73.18 52.77 72.97 54.31 76.16 55.70 72.70 53.57 73.33 53.07
GANX [30] 73.40 59.39 73.33 44.49 79.41 60.96 75.81 34.86 73.22 53.42
No-A 94.72 54.69 94.93 51.63 93.91 59.24 94.54 62.66 94.57 57.14
SCLFA 92.80 55.51 93.01 52.44 91.99 60.08 92.62 63.52 92.65 57.98
P
e
r
m
is
s
io
n
LSD 94.12 55.83 94.34 52.70 93.31 60.52 93.94 64.04 93.97 58.37
CSD 94.57 55.10 94.78 52.03 93.76 59.66 94.39 63.09 94.42 57.56
KSSD [26] 92.53 55.92 92.74 52.85 91.72 60.50 92.35 63.95 92.38 58.40
GANX [30] 93.22 62.34 93.10 43.60 91.98 59.36 92.71 47.73 92.85 57.59
No-A 93.19 84.03 92.86 80.45 93.28 83.59 93.04 82.58 99.22 8.78
SCLFA 88.42 91.22 88.09 88.86 88.15 94.07 88.27 90.27 94.45 43.03
In
t
e
n
t
s LSD 91.21 89.84 90.88 86.69 91.54 90.75 91.06 88.56 97.24 25.00
CSD 91.33 87.82 91.00 84.76 91.53 88.20 91.18 86.58 97.36 24.44
KSSD [26] 90.55 88.86 90.22 86.05 90.13 90.60 90.40 96.07 96.58 30.88
GANX [30] 88.96 94.51 90.58 79.02 90.25 87.26 90.64 95.89 96.55 30.25
